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Introduction 
The effects of the Chinese government’s preferential policy towards the 
inflow of FDI in China, which has been the most popular destination among the 
developing countries for foreign direct investment (FDI) for six consecutive years,  
have been well documented.1 Ho and Huenemann (1984), Chu (1985), Thoburn et 
al. (1990), Huang (1995), Kueh and Ash (1996), Takahashi (1996), Zhang and 
Hung (1996), Cheung (1997) and Yeung (2001a, 2001b) all investigate the issue 
of FDI from the macro-geographical to the micro-geographical perspective. The 
performance of foreign-financed firms in China has also been widely researched. 
Several studies, such as Beamish (1993), EIU (1998), Shaw (1998), Yan (1998) 
and Jefferson et al. (2000), have revealed disappointing performance on the part 
of foreign-financed firms in China. Although high-profile administrative 
intervention in the operation of foreign-financed firms is not common, a number 
of studies have highlighted the bureaucratic red-tape and corruption among 
government officials faced by foreign investors (see, for example, ACC 1998, 
Melvin 1998, Transparency International 2001, Weldon and Vanhonacker 1999). 
Nonetheless, details of how Chinese government policies affect the daily 
operation of foreign-financed firms are surprisingly lacking.  
To fill this literature gap, this paper investigates the impact of various 
Chinese government policies on the competitive advantages of foreign-financed 
manufacturing firms in Guangdong province of southern China. It must be 
emphasised that this paper focuses on the impact of sector-specific policies 
enforced by both central and local (from provincial to county) governments on the 
labour, capital and product markets of foreign-financed manufacturing firms.2 The 
general effects of the Chinese government’s policy incentives on the 
competitiveness of foreign-financed firms will not be investigated, as they are 
already well documented (see above). Furthermore, the effects of government 
policy on the competitiveness of foreign-financed firms in the service sector, 
although a very important topic, is outside the scope of this paper. 
This paper draws heavily on materials obtained from fieldwork in China. 
In addition to informal interviews with government officials, owners and factory 
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managers of locally-funded and privately-funded firms, semi-structured interviews 
were conducted by the authors in 1996-97 and 2000 in 35 foreign-financed 
enterprises located in Guangdong. The sample firms ranged across various 
manufacturing sectors: plastics and metal products, textile and clothing, toys, 
leather products, jewellery, electrical appliances, electronic products, paper and 
foam packaging (including printing), and beverage and food ingredients. With the 
exception of one transnational corporation (TNC) and several subsidiaries of 
regional conglomerates, the majority of firms in the sample were owned by 
investors of Hong Kong origin engaged in processing and assembling (P&A) 
investments. In terms of industrial sectors, textile and clothing (11 cases) and 
manufacturing of electrical appliances (8 cases) account for more than half of the 
total firms interviewed. In terms of employment size, medium-sized firms (51-500 
workers) represent more than two-thirds of the cases. Despite the use of non-
random sampling and most (33 of 35) of the firms investigated were located in 
Dongguan municipality of Guangdong, there is no reason to suggest that the 
findings of this paper is favoured for or biased against certain industrial sectors or 
local governments.3 It must be emphasised that the specific examples illustrated in 
this paper may not be generalised elsewhere as various local governments in 
different counties (even within Dongguan) may interpret and implement the 
central government’s policy directives differently (so as the responses of 
individual firms). Nonetheless, it is argued that the general arguments about the 
impact of sector-specific policies on the factor markets of foreign-financed 
manufacturing firms presented in this paper are generally applicable elsewhere in 
China, especially in coastal provinces other than Guangdong. 
In addition to the general policy on FDI laid down by the central Chinese 
government, the objectives of sector-specific government policies are to lubricate 
the factor markets in labour, capital and products and to facilitate the operations of 
foreign-financed firms in China. Yet in practice, government policies (from 
national to provincial to county) often receive negative comments for being 
ambiguous, authoritarian, inflexible and lacking in co-ordination among various 
government bureaux. How do government policies affect the daily operations of 
foreign-financed firms? To what extent are the costs of running these businesses 
raised, when compared with the locally-funded counterparts? This paper addresses 
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these questions in section 3, and goes on to provide policy implications for the 
further development of the investment environment in Guangdong in section 4. 
First, however, a brief introduction to the economy of Guangdong is in order.  
Background on Guangdong 
With a total land area of 177,901 km2, Guangdong province is located in 
the Pearl River Delta of southern China, adjacent to Hong Kong and Macau. 
Guangdong was transformed into an export-oriented manufacturing-based 
economy through P&A-induced industrialisation and outward-oriented 
commercial agriculture during the early 1980s. After investing heavily in 
construction and infrastructure improvement, particularly in the areas of 
transportation, power supplies and telecommunications, Guangdong provincial 
authorities have focused on the development of higher value-added and higher 
technology sanzi qiye and supporting service sectors since the mid-1990s. 
The success of economic reform in Guangdong manifests itself in an array 
of extraordinary economic statistics. The average annual growth rate between 
1978 and 1999 of real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) reached 12 percent 
(compared to a China-wide average of 9 percent), and real GDP per capita growth 
averaged 11 percent (compared to the Chinese average of 8 percent).4 During 
these two decades of reform in Guangdong, real GDP jumped by eleven times, to 
203 billion yuan, while real GDP per capita increased by eight times to an all-time 
high of 2,779 yuan (53 percent higher than that of China) in 1999.5 In real value of 
industrial and agricultural output, the average annual growth rate in Guangdong 
was 22 percent between 1978 and 1998. The gross value of industrial and 
agricultural output in Guangdong as a percentage of China’s output increased 
from 4.86 percent in 1978 to 9.14 percent in 1998, further illustrating the 
province’s economic strength. Guangdong’s increasing share of the gross value of 
industrial output in China, from 4.71 percent in 1978 to 10.24 percent in 1998, 
and the corresponding decrease in share of the gross value of agricultural output, 
from 5.32 percent in 1978 to 3.78 percent in 1998, illustrate its rapid 
industrialisation (GBS, 2000; SSB, 2001). 
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Guangdong has been the Chinese province the most popular with foreign 
investors. The contracted value of FDI in Guangdong increased enormously from 
1983 to 1993, from US$703 million to an all-time high of US$33 billion, before 
dropping to US$7.7 billion in 1999. The utilised value of FDI rose impressively 
during the same period, from US$327 million in 1983 to US$13.37 billion in 1999. 
In 1999, the cumulative contracted FDI in Guangdong reached US$165 billion, 
and the corresponding utilised value of FDI reached US$90 billion. These figures 
are equivalent to 26-28 percent of the cumulative contracted and utilised value of 
FDI in China between 1979 and 1999. In per capita terms, the average growth of 
utilised FDI in Guangdong reached the impressive rate of 28 percent per annum 
between 1983 and 1999. In 1983, the utilised FDI per capita in Guangdong was 
only US$6, but this increased drastically over the next sixteen years, to US$183 in 
1999 (GBS, 2000; SSB, 2001). 
As a result of export-orientation, Guangdong’s export figures increased 
tremendously, from US$1.4 billion in 1978 to US$78 billion in 1999, an average 
annual growth rate of 23 percent. Export value per capita increased from a mere 
US$27 in 1978 to US$136 in 1989, before increasing by another eight times to 
US$1,065 in 1999 (GBS, 2000; SSB, 2001). 
Government Policies & Competitiveness of Foreign-
financed Firms 
Before discussing sector-specific government policies, it may be useful to 
summarise the general preferential policy on FDI in China. 
After the promulgation of economic reform in 1978, the central 
government in Beijing introduced a number of measures to encourage foreign 
entrepreneurs to invest in China. For instance, the State Council issued 22 Articles 
(Provisions of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China for the 
Encouragement of Foreign Investment) in October 1986 to encourage FDI in 
forms of sanzi qiye, especially in the high-technology-intensive and export-
oriented sectors. The measures to encourage FDI fall into two general categories: 
policies on sanzi qiye and policies on P&A. 
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The following preferential policies apply to foreign investment on sanzi 
qiye (EJVs, CJVs and WFVs): 
• Two tax-free years after the first profit-making year and a 50 percent reduction 
during the following three years for sanzi qiye with a contract life of ten years 
or longer. 
• For ventures engaged in agricultural sectors or established in remote or 
mountainous regions, an additional 15 to 30 percent concession on profit tax 
may be granted by the Finance Bureau for another ten years. Moreover, 40 
percent of tax payable is reimbursed if investors re-invest their profits in China 
on a project with a period of five years or longer. 
• Operational losses incurred by sanzi qiye can be recovered from the profit tax 
payable in the subsequent five financial years. 
• Sanzi qiye engaged in infrastructure construction with investments of 15 years 
or longer are eligible for five tax-free years and another five years at a 50 
percent reduction on the 15 percent profit tax rate. For ventures in financial 
difficulties after the expiry of the tax-free period, the tax-concession period 
may be extended with the approval of Finance Bureau. 
• Exemption from tariffs (import duties) and Consolidated Industrial and 
Commercial Tax, from December 1984 onwards:6 
9 Machinery and components purchased by foreign investors or venture 
capital as specified in venture contracts. 
9 Machinery and components unavailable locally. 
9 Raw materials, components and packing materials specified in venture 
contracts to produce final products for export (Yeung 2001b:69-70). 
For foreign investment in P&A, the following privileges apply:  
• Tax exemption on profits for first three profit-making years for P&A (the 
SOEs involved in P&A contracts are free from profit submission). 
• Exemption from tariffs and Consolidated Industrial and Commercial Tax for 
the importation of raw materials, components, tools and machinery specified 
by P&A contracts, as well as the export of finished products. 
• Import permits are waived for the importation of machinery and tools 
specified by P&A contracts. 
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• Exemption from property tax for three to five years on foreign investor-owned 
factory premises (Yeung 2001b:69-70). 
In spite of the above policy incentives implemented by the Chinese 
government, foreign investors have found that their firms’ operation in China is 
not without its constraints. There is a network of bureaucratic restrictions 
affecting the competitiveness of foreign-financed firms in Guangdong. This 
section investigates the complex web of sector-specific policies enforced by the 
central and local governments in three areas: the labour, capital and product 
markets. An understanding of these policies is crucial for an understanding of the 
changing competitive arena encountered by foreign-financed firms in 
Guangdong.7 
Labour Market 
The effects of Chinese government policies in the labour market of 
foreign-financed firms manifest themselves in three areas: employment permits, 
the levying of miscellaneous fees, and the recruitment of factory managers. 
Every foreign-financed firm in Guangdong has to apply for eight licenses: 
(1) Business registration permit, (2) National tax certificate, (3) Guangdong 
provincial tax certificate, (4) Certificate of Quality License for Export 
Commodities, (5) Certificate of Quarantine License for Export Commodities 
(zoological and plant quarantine permits), (6) Hygiene certificate, (7) Labour 
insurance certificate and (8) Health insurance certificate. Moreover, firms have to 
acquire the following permits on behalf of their employees (Table 1):8 
• Temporary residence permits issued by the local Public Security Bureau, 
renewable every three or six months to one year (this applies to migrant 
workers only). 
• Employment permit issued by the Labour Bureau (this applies to migrant 
workers only).9 
• Single card or planned maternity card for married employees, issued by the 
Labour and Planned Maternity Bureaux. 
• Unemployment insurance, labour insurance, medical insurance and old age 
pension permits from the Social Insurance and Labour Bureaux. 
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[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
The local government imposes a fine or administrative sanction (such as 
withholding of operational licenses) on firms employing workers without all the 
required permits. In some cases, workers do not possess employment permits 
because their previous employers had not completed the appropriate application 
procedures before they resigned. They are usually employed as temporary workers, 
and their employers do not sign formal employment contracts with them. In fact, 
some migrant workers prefer to work on a temporary basis, as it allows them to 
job-hop.10 
By law, the local government levies a miscellaneous charge according to 
the number of workers in the firm, a certain amount of yuan per worker (Table 1). 
In 1997, the total miscellaneous fee for a foreign-financed firm could add up to 
over 100 yuan/worker/month. With the introduction of compulsory subscription to 
unemployment insurance, labour insurance, medical insurance and a pension fund, 
the total miscellaneous fee payable by foreign-financed firms in Guangdong has 
increased dramatically, to at least 150 yuan/worker/month in 2000, a figure that 
accounts for up to 50 percent of the monthly wage bill of an unskilled worker.11 
Obviously, this imposes tremendous pressure upon the profit margins of foreign-
financed firms, as many had not factored these newly introduced charges into their 
original labour cost estimates. The competitiveness of foreign-financed firms in 
Guangdong is further undermined by the fact that a number of locally-funded 
firms are able to avoid paying some of these miscellaneous fees as the Labour 
Bureau focuses their resource on the inspection of foreign-financed firms (field 
survey, 1996-97, 2000). 
In reality, the level of miscellaneous fees payable by foreign-financed 
firms is negotiable and varies geographically, partly because local governments in 
Guangdong realises the negative impact of high fees on the attractiveness of a 
locality for foreign investment if laws are fully enforced (Table 1). Ultimately, the 
level of fees paid depends on guanxi (personal connections), as those firms with 
better connections can get a more favourable “discount” on the fees payable. This 
fact helps to explain why foreign firms always employ local people as factory 
managers: in addition to being “up-to-date” with ever-changing government 
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policies, they have the right connections to the local government.12 In fact, some 
foreign investors claim that the main role of their Chinese JV partners is “to do the 
public relations work with the bureaucracy” (field survey, 1996-97). The issue of 
miscellaneous fees also explains why many foreign-financed firms deliberately 
under-report their worker numbers to the local government. All the firms 
interviewed indicated that they have at various points under-reported by 30-80 
percent their number of employees for the purpose of tax and miscellaneous fee 
evasion (field survey, 1996-97, 2000). 
Fortunately, the degree of transparency of the various charges levied on 
foreign-financed firms is improving. All miscellaneous charges levied on foreign-
financed and locally-funded enterprises must be approved either by the local 
municipal or provincial government. In an effort to stamp out illegal charges, the 
corresponding authorities now issue receipts for every miscellaneous charge. In 
Dongguan, all miscellaneous fees are payable into designated bank accounts 
instead of directly to officials (field survey, 1996-97, 2000). 
Despite improvements in the transparency of the system, however, the 
general situation of miscellaneous charges has deteriorated in some regions within 
Guangdong province. In an extreme case, a foreign-financed firm in the Yantian 
administrative region of Fenggang town had to pay 46 types of miscellaneous 
fees. 13  One was a “postal delivery fee” charged by the Telecommunications 
Bureau. In addition to paying the postal fee, the firm had to pay a “postal delivery 
fee” based on the number of workers, i.e., six to eight yuan per worker per annum. 
It is not difficult to understand why the firm only reported 20 percent of its 200-
strong workforce to the government. Though the absolute amount of some charges 
is small and the total amount of miscellaneous charges is similar to those of the 
past, the increase in the number of charges imposes additional administrative costs 
on firms (field survey, 1996-97, 2000). 
Furthermore, some local governments backdated the newly introduced 
charge for several months, even before the formal approval of the municipal 
government had been given. In other words, a firm could suddenly receive bills 
for some unknown charge for the last six months, as well as a fine for being 
overdue in paying it. This is another reason why foreign-financed firms employ 
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local people as factory managers, as they have the connections and knowledge to 
deal with the ever-changing regulations. 
It is neither the miscellaneous charges per se nor the total amount of such 
charges that most annoy foreign investors in Guangdong; the most frustrating 
factors are the ambiguity and variety of regulations, and associated high 
transaction costs. The ambiguity of miscellaneous charges and the tie-in of such 
charges with the number of employees certainly increases the real labour costs of 
foreign-financed firms in China. 
Capital Market 
The impact of Chinese government policies on the capital market of 
foreign-financed firms is felt through the uniform rate of value-added, the 
“estimated profits” approach of taxation, the export value-added tax (VAT) and 
the import-deposit.   
To simplify administrative duties and regulate transfer pricing by the 
TNCs, the State Bureau of Foreign Exchange uses a uniform rate of value-added 
and the State Bureau of Taxation uses the “estimated profits” (“deemed profits”) 
approach to assess the profitability of every foreign-financed firm conducting the 
“value-added verification” in the same industrial sector (Table 1).14 The State 
Bureau of Foreign Exchange determining the rate of value-added according to the 
industrial sector that the firm belongs to (e.g. x percent of value-added for the 
textile industry, y percent of value-added for the garment industry, etc.). The State 
Bureau of Taxation uses a pre-determined and progressive percentage rate to 
determine the value of the firm’s output and its profitability.15 However, these two 
general rules of thumb take neither the productivity nor the special circumstances 
of the individual firm into consideration. For instance, the value-added of polo 
shirts manufactured by a US-based garment firm is very high, due to its successful 
marketing strategy and its allocated US quotas. However, the value-added of its 
two wholly foreign-owned ventures (WFVs) in Shenzhen is well below the 
industrial norm, since these only produce part of the polo shirt (e.g. a sleeve or 
collar) and use costly imported raw materials. Since the State Bureau of Foreign 
Exchange has granted no exemption for the firm, the firm’s Asian headquarters 
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has to remit more than 14 million yuan/month from Hong Kong to Shenzhen, 
even though the actual value-added of these two firms is about 10 million 
yuan/month. Consequently, the two WFVs have accumulated about 40 million 
yuan of idle cash within a year since the new policy was implemented.16 The State 
Bureau of Taxation generally assumes that profitable firms will produce more, but 
there is no standardised procedure for the Bureau to determine the rate of 
“estimated profits”. The rate of “estimated profits” may be negotiable when the 
foreign-financed firm is able to provide adequate evidence from independent 
auditor reports (e.g. PriceWaterhouseCoopers) to support their claims (field 
survey, 2000). This arrangement unavoidably leads to discontent among foreign-
financed firms. 
In July 1998, the State Administration of Taxation announced that a 8 
percent VAT would be implemented from 1 January 1999 (Table 1) on the export 
value of import-processing P&A firms (laiyang jiagong, where P&A firms import 
raw materials and export finished products on their own accounts). As the new 
VAT law was backdated for two years, this had a tremendous impact on the 
import-processing P&A firms: the VAT was not budgeted in their export prices, 
since their imports and exports were VAT-free before the implementation of the 
new law. To circumvent the VAT, P&A firms changed from import-processing to 
contract-processing (lailiao jiagong, where P&A firms manufacture finished 
goods for clients who import their own raw materials). If the new VAT law is 
fully implemented, the Guangdong Provincial Foreign Economic and Trade 
Commission estimates that its back-dating will wipe out the combined 1997 
profits of import-processing P&A firms.17 Due to the slowing of the influx of FDI 
and the lobbying efforts of the Guangdong government, the State Council decided 
to grant a two-year extension of the so-called “grandfather rule” (tax relief on the 
VAT), which was introduced on 1 January 1994 and stated that import-processing 
P&A firms established before 1994 could have tax refunds for five years if they 
paid more taxes due to taxation reform at the beginning of 1994. The two-year 
extension allowed import-processing P&A firms to refund any extra VAT that 
they may have to pay until 31 December 2000. However, the tax relief is not 
applicable to import-processing P&A firms established after 1994, as their export 
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VAT is calculated according to the same criteria as locally-funded exporters 
(SCMP, 1998a, 1998b, 1998c). 
With the exception of firms classified as class AA, A or B, Customs 
regulations stipulate that, from 1 October 1999 (Table 1), foreign-financed firms 
have to put down about 30 percent of the value of imported raw materials as a 
deposit, to guarantee that all of their finished products are for export.18 Customs 
inspectors have the authority to confiscate the deposit if the firm does not verify 
its production contract with export documents within three months of the import 
of raw materials. Moreover, foreign-financed firms also have to appoint 
designated auditors to prepare daily records of imports/exports for Customs.19 
Following the announcement of the agreement on World Trade Organization 
(WTO) accession with the US in late 1999, customs verification rules have been 
enforced strictly, a situation that has profound implications for the cash flow of 
foreign-financed firms. For instance, a Hong Kong-based textile fabric enterprise 
has to set aside up to HK$100 million per month as import-deposit for its three 
cotton yarn spinning firms in Guangdong. For a large-scale firm with abundant 
capital, the strict enforcement of the customs verification policy resulted in an 
immediate quadrupling of its cash flow. This obviously causes considerable 
disruption to the short-term operation of the firm. For a small and medium-size 
enterprise (SME) with limited capital, the likely result is a severe drain of working 
capital, which in the worst scenario may push the firm to the edge of closing down 
(field survey, 1996-97, 2000). 
The authoritarian nature of these policies (especially the uniform rate of 
the value-added and the “estimated profits” approach to taxation) obviously 
counters some of the policy incentives, such as the tax-free holiday, designed to 
attract foreign investors. This is because the “saving” on profit tax granted to 
foreign-financed firms at the time of their establishment is partially offset by the 
(possible) increase in the payment of the profit tax (due to the “estimated profits” 
approach of taxation) after the expiration of their tax-free holiday in Guangdong. 
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Product Market 
The impact of Chinese government policies in the product market of 
foreign-financed firms manifested itself in forms of production contracts and 
verification rules on imports and exports.20 
To facilitate the operation of foreign-financed enterprises and relieve 
pressures on transportation networks, the Guangdong government has 
collaborated with Chinese Customs to introduce a “transferred goods 
arrangement” for foreign-financed firms. This arrangement, which requires the 
prior approval of Customs, allows a foreign-financed firm to sell and transport 
directly its finished goods to another foreign or locally-funded firm located in 
China, provided that the following three conditions are fulfilled: (1) all final 
products of the transferred goods are for export; (2) both companies have import 
licenses for the transferred goods; and (3) the quantity of transferred goods is less 
than the quantity of goods imported by the firm.  
However, the convenience of the transferred goods arrangement for 
foreign-financed firms is offset by other Customs regulations, e.g. production 
contracts (field survey, 1996-97). Foreign-financed firms have to apply every six 
months for a production contract from Customs to import raw materials into 
China free of tariffs (Table 1). For every shipment of raw materials or finished 
products, foreign-financed firms have to apply to Customs for import or export 
declaration permits. To counter bureaucratic red tape, some foreign-financed firms 
are either sharing their production contract to have the right to import tariff-free 
raw materials, or are smuggling part of their raw materials into China without 
proper documentation. In cases when cargo impounded at the Shenzhen-Hong 
Kong border, foreign-financed firms normally pay off Customs inspectors to 
cover up their illegitimate activities. As the timely delivery of cargo is essential, 
and as it is too time-consuming to negotiate with Customs inspectors, foreign 
owners normally instruct their truck drivers to bribe the inspectors (field survey, 
1996-97, 2000). This phenomenon is also documented in Yeung (2001a, 2001b). 
Due to the corruption eradication policy implemented by the central 
government, most Customs inspectors will no longer accept bribes (field survey, 
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2000). The strict enforcement of regulations on production contracts is equivalent 
to removing the “first-mover” competitive advantage of foreign-financed firms. 
This is because production contracts contain strict definitions of the quantity and 
variety of raw materials that the firm is allowed to import tariff-free every six 
months. Obviously, this inflexibility does not facilitate meeting dynamic market 
demand, as the firm is unable to increase production at short notice for an 
unexpectedly large order, or to introduce new products which demand raw 
materials not specified in the production contract. The rigidity of the production 
contract system has far-reaching consequences for the competitive advantages of 
foreign-financed firms, especially those engaging in sub-contracting businesses 
where flexibility to change production lines to adapt to the seasonality of markets 
and to sell new products is vital to success. 
To prevent tax evasion and the illegal re-selling of tariff-free raw materials 
imported by foreign-financed firms, the State Bureau of Foreign Exchange co-
operates with Customs to strictly implement verification rules on imports and 
exports (hexiao) (Table 1). Foreign-financed firms have to submit their 
production contracts to Chinese Customs, with daily records and documentation 
pertaining to the importation of raw materials, the export of finished goods, and 
the amount of raw materials in stock, in order to verify that their imported tariff-
free raw materials are processed and exported to overseas markets. There are two 
types of regulation on verification: “gross-value verification” (cune hexiao) and 
“value-added verification” (chae hexiao). Under “gross-value verification”, the 
foreign owner/buyer must remit the total amount of foreign exchange to China to 
import/export the exact value of their raw materials/finished products. Under 
“value-added verification”, the foreign investor only remits the amount of value 
added, that is the difference between the value of the imported raw materials and 
the value of the exported semi-finished or finished goods. This method of 
verification is only applicable if the transactions (import and export) are 
conducted within the same enterprise. Obviously, the “value-added verification” 
arrangement demands much less operational capital from foreign-financed firms, 
and this regulation favours those TNCs that are vertically integrated, from 
manufacturing to wholesaling. 21  For SMEs, the “gross-value verification” 
arrangement imposes great financial pressure (field survey, 2000).22 
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Paradoxically, the stringent enforcement of customs inspection rules in 
China not only punishes foreign-financed firms who are conducting illegal trade, 
but also creates obstacles for law-abiding foreign-financed firms. All the 
documentation imposes extra transaction costs on foreign-financed firms and 
provides golden rent-seeking opportunities for Customs inspectors. Whenever 
there is any discrepancy between the import and export declaration forms, 
Customs inspectors regard undeclared goods (the raw materials not declared for 
sale to other foreign-financed firms as finished products) as sales for the local 
market. In addition to imposing a fine, Customs inspectors impose a surcharge of 
40 percent of the value of undeclared raw materials. As there are numerous 
products and different categories of tariff systems, it is unlikely that every 
Customs inspector has intimate knowledge of all of them (Table 1).23 It is also not 
easy for Customs inspectors to decide which cargo is deliberately under- or over-
reported in the import or export documents. As a transparent legal channel for 
arbitration on the legality of import and export activities does not exist, the 
general practice for Customs inspectors is to refer the suspected cases to the 
Inspection Department pending further action when they find minor irregularities 
between the cargo and the documents. By doing so, Customs inspectors avoid the 
dangers of being accused of being lenient towards a particular firm. By “scaring 
off the monkey by killing the chicken” (shaji xiahou), they also send an 
unambiguous signal to other foreign investors that they can no longer bribe their 
way out. Once the cargo is impounded, however, it takes at least 2-3 days for the 
investigation, and the company involved may miss its shipment date. Worse still, 
Customs can downgrade the foreign-financed firm’s rating, thus further 
diminishing its competitiveness, since after downgrading, a firm is obliged to pay 
30 percent of its imported value as import-deposit (field survey, 1996-97, 2000).24 
Undeniably, the stringent nature of the policy (especially the verification 
rules on imports and exports) and the resultant possibility of impoundment of 
cargo at the border partially counters some of the competitive advantages of 
foreign-financed firms over locally-funded firms, who are allowed to import raw 
materials tariff-free. 
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Conclusions & Policy Implications 
The stated objectives of government sector-specific policies in the labour, 
capital and product markets are to lubricate the factor markets and to facilitate the 
operation of foreign-financed in China. For example, the policy on employment 
permits aims to provide a social safety net for workers, to implement birth control 
policies, and to regulate the control of migrant workers, whilst the “estimated 
profits” approach to taxation and the import-deposit are aimed to prevent the 
transfer pricing by TNCs, tax evasion, and the illegal re-selling of tariff-free 
imported raw materials by foreign-financed firms. Nevertheless, in reality the 
implementation of such policies directly and indirectly imposes higher transaction 
costs on foreign-financed firms’ daily operation, which offsets some of the 
economic benefits gained under the central government’s preferential FDI policy 
and thus diminishes their competitive advantages over locally-funded firms in 
Guangdong. 
In the labour market, the ambiguity and variety of miscellaneous fees and 
their associated high transaction costs frustrate foreign entrepreneurs. The 
ambiguity of miscellaneous fees and the backdating of such charges for several 
months after they are formally approved, in addition to the government’s linkage 
of miscellaneous charges to the number of a firm’s employees, certainly increase 
the real labour costs of foreign-financed firms. In other words, one of the seeming 
locational advantages of Guangdong for foreign-financed firms, the low nominal 
labour costs, is not as attractive as it may have first appeared. 
In the capital market, the authoritarian nature of government policies 
(especially the uniform rates of the value-added and “estimated profits” 
approaches to taxation) obviously offset some of the policy incentives, such as the 
tax-free holiday, exclusive for foreign investors in China. This is because the 
“saving” on profit tax granted to foreign-financed firms at the time of their 
establishment is partially offset by the (possible) increase in the payment of profit 
tax (due to the “estimated profits” approach of taxation) after the expiration of 
their tax-free holiday in China. Other policies implemented by the government, 
such as the export VAT, will further fuel the conspiracy theory that the aim of 
such policies is to re-gain the “lost” profit-tax from foreign-financed firms.25 
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Moreover, the compulsory submission of daily import-export records to Customs 
imposes additional administrative duties and thus increases the transaction costs of 
operating manufacturing firms. 
In the product market, the stringent nature of policies and the resultant 
possibility of the impoundment of cargo at the border partially cancels out some 
of the competitive advantages of foreign-financed firms over locally-funded firms, 
which are allowed to import tariff-free raw materials into China. In practice, the 
verification rules on imports and exports partially offset the saving on transport 
and transaction costs for foreign-financed firms under the “transferred goods 
arrangement”. Without making provisions for special circumstances in a specific 
industry, such as the sub-contracting firms in clothing industry, in reality, this 
“punish someone as a warning to others” strategy of policy implementation 
imposes unnecessary and even detrimental constraints on the cash flow and 
operations of foreign-financed firms, especially SMEs with limited capital.  
For law enforcement officers, the stringent implementation of new policies 
is a signal of the rule of law and a necessary preparation for WTO accession. For 
law-abiding foreign investors, the inflexibility and rigidity of government officials 
who do not take into account firms’ circumstances imposes serious roadblocks. 
Worse still, the lack of co-ordination among different bureaux further restricts the 
arbitration between bureaux and foreign investors. Consequently, the plight of 
some foreign investors can easily be exaggerated and dramatised by the media, e.g. 
the 46 items of miscellaneous fees levied in Fenggang town. If this sentiment of 
discrimination among foreign investors is not openly and firmly addressed by 
government officials through appropriate reforms in policy implementation, SMEs 
with limited capital could be rapidly crowded out, increasing the numbers of 
unemployed, especially among migrant workers, in Guangdong. Furthermore, it is 
possible that some of the large-scale foreign-financed firms, annoyed with the 
“bureaucratic maze”, may consider pulling out of Guangdong as well. 
To prevent the crowding-out of SMEs having a domino effect among all 
types of foreign-financed firms, the central and Guangdong governments should 
reduce the unnecessary uncertainty of the investment environment in Guangdong 
and increase the transparency on policy implementation. For instance, there 
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should be no backdating of miscellaneous charges; the policy should be uniform 
for every firm (i.e. no special “discounts” for firms with personal connections).26 
The government might consider holding consultations on FDI policy with foreign 
investors on the issue of implementation before its enforcement. Such a process 
would improve communication and reduce unnecessary misunderstanding 
between government officials and foreign investors. The Chinese government can 
also improve the training of Customs inspectors. More knowledgeable Customs 
inspectors would reduce the chance of unnecessary impounding of cargo at the 
China-Hong Kong Customs border. Transparent legal channels for arbitration 
would also reduce rent-seeking opportunities for the Customs officials and factory 
managers. Obviously, this would reduce the transaction costs of doing business 
and improve the investment environment in Guangdong. 
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1 Unlike the conventional definition of FDI as “the act of acquiring assets outside one’s home 
country” (Grubel, 1987:403) or “cross-border expenditures to acquire or expand corporate control 
of productive assets” (Froot, 1993:1), the official Chinese definition incorporates three forms of 
direct foreign-invested enterprises (sanzi qiye) – equity joint ventures (EJVs), contractual joint 
ventures (CJVs) and wholly foreign-owned ventures (WFVs) – as well as joint exploration of 
resources. The conventional definition of FDI embraces WFVs and EJVs, but excludes CJVs. For 
simplicity’s sake, this paper defines FDI as the inflow of foreign capital (including that from Hong 
Kong and Macau) in the forms of sanzi qiye and sanlai yibu. Sanlai yibu (three forms of 
processing and assembling, P&A, and compensation trade) are defined by the Chinese authority as 
an “other form of foreign investment” rather than FDI. Readers interested in the detailed 
classification of FDI in China can refer to Yeung (2001b:3-7). 
2 “Sector-specific policies” are those Chinese (central and local) government policies specifically 
formulated to regulate the operation of labour, capital and product markets of foreign-financed 
manufacturing firms. This term is used to distinguish these strategies from other general 
government policies, such as policy incentives to attract the inflow of FDI, implemented in China. 
3 Every Sinologist knows that securing the appropriate personal connections is a necessary and 
probably the most important precondition for conducting a field survey in China. This explains 
why the majority of interviewed firms are located in Dongguan. The use of non-random sampling 
is, in fact, commonly employed by Sinologists, e.g. Child (1994), Warner (1994, 1995), Lin (1996), 
MacBean (1996). 
4 As the consumer price index is only available from 1984 onward, the retail price index-based 
GDP deflator is used to estimate real GDP. 
5 It is estimated that migrants working and living in Guangdong account for one-third to one-half 
of its local population of 72.99 million. The official statistics only report the size of the local 
population. Therefore, it can be argued that the economic performance of Guangdong in terms of 
real GDP per capita is “inflated” by official data. This has tremendous implications on the regional 
inequality of growth at provincial level. 
6 From 1 April 1996, the central government removed the tax-free status of imports of machinery 
and capital goods by foreign-financed enterprises. After protests from numerous foreign 
entrepreneurs, the government granted a period of grace to those foreign-financed projects 
launched before 1 April 1996. For projects valued below US$30 million, the tariff exemption 
period was extended until the end of 1997, while the grace period was extended until the end of 
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1998 for those projects valued above US$30 million. To encourage foreign investment in high-
technology sectors, the Chinese government decided to give exceptional waivers of import duties 
to 18 industries from 1 January 1998 onwards (FT, 1998). 
7 Some of the arguments in this section are discussed in more detail in Yeung (2001b). 
8 As most migrant workers do not have enough cash to process the application themselves, firms 
employing them have to report to and pay the appropriate authorities before deducting the 
application fees from their wages in instalments. 
9  Local people can work for any firm by producing their identity cards before signing the 
employment contract. 
10 As the majority of (unskilled) workers are migrants, the local government does not pressure 
foreign investors to keep on poorly performing staff; the local government does not have to 
shoulder social security benefits for sacked migrants. After all, the local government benefits 
economically from the success of joint ventures (JVs) through tax income. Ironically, one manager 
of a JV suggests that “it is much more difficult to sack an employee in the Hong Kong branch than 
in China, due to the ‘unique’ corporate culture of our company” (field survey, 2000). 
11 The pension fund is for any employee, including migrants, who has worked in the firm for three 
years or longer. The cost of pension funds alone ranged from 30-117 yuan/worker/month (field 
survey, 2000). 
12 As might be expected, nepotism is not uncommon in recruitment for “non-critical” posts. 
13 In 1998, the central government disciplined 1,273 officials in local governments for levying 
illegitimate miscellaneous fees on enterprises. To improve the investment environment, the central 
government abolished 973 items of miscellaneous fees with a total value of 45 billion yuan per 
annum, while local governments removed another staggering 26,710 items of miscellaneous fees, 
with a total value of 98.5 billion yuan in 1998. In six provinces (Guangdong, Jiangsu, Hebei, 
Henan, Hunan and Sichuan), the items of arbitrary levies decreased by 30 percent (HKS, 1999).  
14 Refer to the next section on product markets for an explanation of “value-added verification”. 
15 The State Bureau of Taxation uses the information provided by Customs rather than the account 
books of foreign-financed firms to determine the value of output. 
16 The firm cannot remit the cash overseas, due to strict Chinese foreign exchange controls. 
17 However, some analysts estimate that the real impact of this new VAT law will be limited, as 
most P&A firms in the Pearl River Delta are engaged in contract-processing. The “real” impact of 
the VAT law on import processing P&A firms also depends on the proportion of materials and 
finished products that are actually imported and exported respectively. 
18 The import-deposit consists of about 10 percent of customs duty and about 17 percent of import 
VAT levied on the import of raw materials classified in the protected or sensitive sectors in China. 
According to the new “Customs Administration of Enterprises by Categories”, foreign-financed 
firms with annual export values of US$10 million or above and without records of illegal 
smuggling are given priority to be granted the import-tariff-free class AA status. Firms in aircraft 
and ship manufacturing industries for export (or other selected high-tech sectors) will be granted 
class AA automatically. Companies ranked as class A or B have to pay the import-deposit only for 
the import of restricted goods. Firms with low export value and poor records of compliance with 
customs laws are classified as class C, while firms involved in smuggling of over 500,000 yuan 
since 1 August 1998 are classified as class D (SCMP, 1999a, 1999b, 1999c, 1999d, 1999e, 2000a). 
After more than a year of negotiation, the Guangdong government has allowed Hong Kong-based 
foreign investors to provide bank guarantees in lieu of cash for the import-deposit (SCMP, 2001). 
19 Foreign-financed firms only have to submit a monthly imports/exports report to Customs to 
verify their production contracts in the past. The submission of daily imports/exports records 
obviously imposes additional costs. 
20 Some foreign investors also complain about the conflict of their business interests with those of 
their JV partners, e.g. their JV partners establish new firms which compete with the JV businesses 
directly (field survey, 2000). 
21 The restrictions upon the local distribution channels of foreign-financed firms also limit their 
ability to sell their products locally. 
22 Recent legislation approved by the National People’s Congress stipulates that CJVs and WFVs 
are no longer required to remit foreign exchange from abroad to meet their foreign exchange 
requirement (SCMP, 2000b). 
23 The lack of (qualified) manpower in Customs accentuates the difficulties of law enforcement. 
Educated and well-qualified young people in China tend to join foreign-owned JVs or private 
companies rather than work in the civil service sector. 
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24 This partially explains why there have been numerous complaints against Chinese Customs 
during the last few years. A number of Hong Kong-based investors assume that guanxi (personal 
connections) plus money pay-offs can solve most, if not all, of the problems that their ventures 
may encounter. Since the central government cracked down hard on corruption, to investors’ 
dismay, this previous “magic formula” is no longer working (field survey, 2000). 
25 It can be argued that “economic factors” may partially explain the ambivalent attitude of some 
local governments toward foreign-financed firms. After more than two decades of economic 
reform, some local governments in Guangdong may realise that there can be various reasons for 
them to collect revenues from foreign-financed firms, e.g. by charging them various miscellaneous 
fees (although some of the reasons may not be fully legitimate). This is an “unintended” 
consequence of decentralisation of authority by the central government since the economic reform. 
26  The recent abolishment of 27,770 items of miscellaneous fees by the central and local 
governments is the first step in the right direction (the arbitrary levies in Guangdong have been 
reduced by 30 percent) (HKS, 1999). 
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Table 1: A Typology of the Effects of Chinese Government Policies on the Competitive Advantage of Foreign-financed Firms in Southern China 
Policies: Aims: Policy details: Effects on foreign-financed firms: 
Permits for 
employment  
• To provide a social 
safety net for workers 
• To implement birth 
control policies 
• To regulate migrant 
workers 
• Unemployment insurance, labour 
insurance, and old age pension for every 
worker 
• Single card for unmarried employees & 
planned maternity card for married 
employees 
• Temporary residence & employment 
permits for migrants 
• Compulsory subscription to pension 
fund increases the production costs, 
e.g. up to 30% of wage bills 
• FDI firms are subjected to fines or 
administrative sanctions if any 
employee does not possess all permits 
Miscellaneous fees 
• To recoup the costs 
of services provided 
by various bureaux 
• The amount of miscellaneous fees tied-in 
with the number of workers 
• Some local governments backdated the 
newly-introduced charge by several 
months, even before the formal approval 
date of the municipal government 
• In reality, the amount of payable 
miscellaneous fee is negotiable and 
various geographically 
• Firms with better connections can get 
a “discount” on the payable fee 
Uniform rate of 
value-added & the 
“estimated profits” 
approach of taxation 
• To simplify the 
government’s 
administrative duties 
• To regulate the 
transfer pricing of 
TNCs 
• For FDI firms who conduct the “value-
added verification”, the same rate of 
value-added is applied in the same 
industrial sector 
• The firm’s profitability is equal to its 
output value multiplied by a pre-
determined & progressive percentage rate 
• Takes neither the productivity nor the 
special circumstances (e.g. US textile 
quotas) of an individual firm into 
consideration 
• Discontent among FDI firms, as there 
is no standardised procedure on the 
determination of estimated profits rate 
Export VAT 
• To prevent tax 
evasion by FDI firms 
• From 1 January 1999 onwards, 8% VAT 
is levied on the export value of import- 
processing P&A firms  
• The two-year backdated period of 
VAT law has tremendous impact on 
import-processing P&A firms (imports 
and exports were VAT-free before the 
new law) 
Import-deposit • To prevent the illegal reselling of tariff-free 
• FDI firms are classified into 5 classes 
(AA, A, B, C & D) since 1 October 1999. 
• Favours firms in high-tech sectors & 
export-oriented large-scale firms, as 
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raw materials 
imported by FDI 
firms in the local 
market 
• To prevent tax 
evasion by  FDI firms
• Firms classified as class A & B have to 
pay the import deposit only for the import 
of restricted goods 
• Firms classified as class C & D have to 
put down about 30% of the value of 
imported raw materials as a deposit 
• Customs can confiscate the import deposit 
if the firm does not verify that the finished 
products have been exported within 3 
months of the import of raw materials 
they are automatically classified as 
class AA (import deposit is waived) 
• A severe drain of operational capital 
for the SMEs with low export value, 
due to the large amount of payable 
import deposit 
• Additional administrative duties to 
prepare the daily import-export 
records submitted to  Customs 
Production contract 
• To prevent the illegal 
reselling of tariff-free 
raw materials on the 
local market 
• The production contract outlines the strict 
definitions of the quantity & variety of 
raw materials that the FDI firm can import 
free of tariffs over a six-month period 
• FDI firms have to renew their production 
contract every six months 
• High transaction costs to justify the 
need to import more raw materials 
than allowed under the contract 
• Unable to facilitate market demand & 
removes the “first-mover” competitive 
advantage of sub-contracting firms 
Verification rules on 
imports & exports 
• To prevent the illegal 
reselling of tariff-free 
raw materials in the 
local market 
• To prevent tax 
evasion by FDI firms 
• Under the “gross-value verification”, the 
foreign owner/buyer remits the total 
amount of foreign exchange to China to 
import/export the exact value of their raw 
materials/finished products 
• Under the “value-added verification”, the 
foreign investor remits the amount of 
value-added to China, if the transaction is 
conducted within the enterprise 
• Imported tariff-free raw materials have to 
be verified as processed & exported 
• The “gross-value verification” 
arrangement demands more working 
capital from the SMEs, while the 
“value-added verification” 
arrangement favours those TNCs that 
are vertically integrated, from 
manufacturing to wholesaling 
• Unnecessary impounding of cargo 
• Lack of a transparent legal channel for 
arbitration 
Source: Field survey, 1996-97 & 2000. 
 
